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NLRB Primary Jurisdiction and Hot Cargo
Issues Arising in Section 301(a) Actions
Section 8(e) of the Labor Management Relations Act1
("LMRA") makes it an unfair labor practice for a union and an
employer to enter into a hot cargo agreement. Such an agreement
is a form of secondary labor activity by which a union secures the
support of a neutral secondary employer in a labor dispute be-
tween the union and another, primary employer. Under the agree-
ment, the neutral secondary employer agrees to cease doing busi-
ness with the primary employer. This loss of business generally
increases the economic pressure on the primary employer to accept
the union's position in the labor dispute and often burdens the
neutral secondary employer by eliminating a traditional market or
a low cost source of supply.'
There are two possible forums for the resolution of hot cargo
issues. The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board")
has the power to prevent the enforcement of these agreements.4 At
the same time, hot cargo disputes are within the scope of the fed-
eral courts' jurisdiction over labor-management contracts granted
' Labor Management Relations Act, § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976) [hereinafter cited
as LMRA]. Section 8(e) was added to the LMRA by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA"), Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 704(b), 73 Stat. 519, 543-44. It
reads in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases
or refrains from handling, using, selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in any of the
products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and
any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an
agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible [sic] and void ....
The portion of section 8(e) not quoted here creates exceptions for certain agreements in the
congtruction and clothing industries.
I The term "hot cargo" agreement is derived from the extensive use of these restrictive
agreements as an economic pressure tactic by the Teamsters Union in the transportation
industry. See H. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-23 (1959), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLosuRE AcT OF 1959,
at 778-81 (1959) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA HISTORY]; S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 79-80 (1959) (minority report), reprinted in 1 LMRDA HISTORY, supra, at 475-76.
3 H. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-23 (1959), reprinted in 1 LMRDA HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 778-81 (impact of hot cargo agreements on primary employers). See text
and note at note 73 infra (impact of secondary boycotts on secondary employers).
I LMRA §§ 10(b), (c), (e), (1), 19 U.S.C. §§ 160(b), (c), (e), (1) (1976).
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by section 301(a) of the LMRA. 5 The courts of appeals have taken
a variety of approaches in determining what their function is in
resolving hot cargo issues in section 301(a) contract actions.
This comment evaluates these approaches by considering the
language and legislative history of section 8(e), the rationale for
and exceptions to the doctrine of NLRB primary jurisdiction, and
the arguments for departing from that doctrine in the special con-
text of section 8(e). The comment also considers whether equitable
concerns for union pension fund trustees should alter the. analysis.
It concludes that in most cases, the federal courts should assert
jurisdiction and decide hot cargo issues when they arise in section
301(a) suits.
LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). The full text of that section reads:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization rep-
resenting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Section 301(a) does not deprive state courts of jurisdiction over breach of contract actions in
the labor field, Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507 (1962), although state
courts must apply "principles of federal labor law." Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962).
6 See text and notes at notes 13-21 infra. The hot cargo issue in section 301(a) actions
implicates two broader concerns. First, the issue reflects the problem of deciding whether
the courts should resolve hot cargo disputes in contexts other than section 301(a) contract
enforcement actions. Although the scope of this comment is limited to the section 301(a)
context, the other contexts are relevant to the analysis. See text and notes at notes 67-77, 84
infra.
Second, the question reflects the problem of deciding whether the courts should resolve
other unfair labor practice issues in section 301(a) enforcement actions. See Meltzer, The
Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations (pt. 2), 59 COLUM.
L. REv. 269, 289-301 (1959); Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the
NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REv. 529, 559-68 (1963). See, e.g., Local 1898, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists
v. Brake & Elec. Sales Corp., 279 F.2d 590, 592-93 (1st Cir. 1960) (accepting the employer's
argument that the union security clause did not apply when the discharge of an employee
under the clause would require the employer to commit an unfair labor practice under
LMRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976)); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communica-
tions Workers Local 6222, 343 F. Supp. 1165, 1171-72 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (refusing in em-
ployer's suit to enforce no-strike clause to consider whether the employer's alleged unfair
labor practices justified the union's strike). In several cases courts have refused to force an
employer to commit an unfair labor practice under LMRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1976), when the representational status of the union representing its employees changed
between the rendering of an arbitration award favorable to the union and a suit for enforce-
ment of the award. General Warehousemen & Helpers Local 767 v. Standard Brands, Inc.,
579 F.2d 1282, 1291-93 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979); Glen-
dale Mfg. Co. v. Local 520, ILGWU, 283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950
(1961). See also Meyers v. Kinney Motors, Inc., 32 A.D.2d 266, 301 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1969) (per
curiam). This comment does not propose to provide a complete analysis of every situation
encompassed by the broader problem of unfair labor practices in section 301(a) actions.
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I. BACKGROUND
Hot cargo issues can arise in three ways in section 301(a) ac-
tions. First, an employer may refuse to implement the alleged hot
cargo agreement, and the union, or a pension fund trustee who is
a third party beneficiary under the agreement,8 sues for breach of
contract. The employer then raises the hot cargo issue as a defense,
claiming that the agreement is unenforceable and void under sec-
tion 8(e).9 Second, the employer may seek a declaratory judgment
that the agreement is illegal.10 Finally, the employer may defend
against a union action to enforce an arbitration award by arguing
that the award is based on a hot cargo agreement. 1 The hot cargo
issue warrants the same treatment in all three kinds of cases.12
E.g., Pittsburgh Die Sinkers Lodge No. 50 v. Pittsburgh Forgings Co., 255 F. Supp.
142 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
8 E.g., Mullins v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 642 F.2d 1302, 1305-08 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981) (No. 80-1345); Waggoner v. R. McGray, Inc., 607 F.2d 1229,
1231 (9th Cir. 1979); Huge v. Long's Hauling Co., 590 F.2d 457, 459 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 918 (1979). Only the Mullins court, 642 F.2d at 1311-13, 1318 n.13, and one
judge in Huge v. Long's Hauling Co., 590 F.2d at 464-65 (Adams, J., concurring), found the
plaintiff's status as a pension fund trustee relevant.
In Mullins the trustees also sought to enforce the pension fund obligation under Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3) (1976) (providing pension fund participants, beneficiaries and trustees with a
right of action to enforce the provisions of ERISA "or the terms of the plan").
E.g., Pittsburgh Die Sinkers Lodge No. 50 v. Pittsburgh Forgings Co., 255 F. Supp.
142 (W.D, Pa. 1966).
10 E.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Marine & Shipbldg. Workers Local 39, 344 F.2d 107
(2d Cir. 1965), af'g 232 F. Supp. 589 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). If the union seeks a declaratory
judgment on the section 8(e) issue, the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, §§ 1-15, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976), may deny the only remedy that is effective before
the employer repudiates the agreement. The proper accomodation between section 301 and
the Norris-LaGuardia Act is an unsettled area in labor law. Compare Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 410-13 (1976) (Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits injunc-
tion to enforce no-strike clause where the strike is the arbitrable grievance) with Boys Mar-
kets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253-55 (1970) (Norris-LaGuardia Act does
not prevent injunction to enforce no-strike clause where strike protests grievance subject to
mandatory arbitration).
11 E.g., Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. Maloney Specialties, Inc., 639
F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1980); Botany Indus., Inc. v. New York Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing
Workers, 375 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated and dismissed as moot sub nom. Robb v.
New York Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 506 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974).
12 If the courts can decide section 8(e) issues, there is no basis for limiting the form of
the employer's remedy. It is clear that declaratory judgment actions are acceptable under
section 301. El Paso Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. El Paso Chapter, Associated Gen.
Contractors, 376 F.2d 797, 799-800 (5th Cir. 1967); Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n
of Machinists Dist. 137, 313 F.2d 179, 181-82 (2d Cir. 1962). Although the general policy
favoring arbitration as a method of resolving labor disputes limits the courts' review of arbi-
tration awards, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-98
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The courts of appeals have taken contradictory approaches in
disposing of hot cargo issues when raised by employers in section
301(a) actions. The Second Circuit has ruled that the NLRB's pri-
mary jurisdiction over unfair labor practices' s does not prevent a
court in a section 301(a) action from declaring a contract clause
void and excusing nonperformance when it finds that the clause
violates section 8(e)." When NLRB resolution of the claim is
pending, the Second Circuit occasionally has stayed section 301(a)
proceedings and incorporated the Board's hot cargo ruling into its
resolution of the contract claim. 15 This practice, however, is
animated only by a spirit of comity; the Second Circuit asserts that
it possesses the power to resolve hot cargo claims.""
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960), arbitration does not
legitimize an otherwise illegal contract. Botany Indus., Inc. v. New York Joint Bd., Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers, 375 F. Supp. 485, 491 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated and dismissed as moot
sub nom. Robb v. New York Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 506 F.2d 1246 (2d
Cir. 1974). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974) (arbitration
award finding no discrimination does not deprive court of jurisdiction in the same dispute
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. II
1978)).
13 For a discussion of the NLRB's primary jurisdiction, see text and notes at notes 42-
51 infra.
14 E.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Marine & Shipbldg. Workers Local 39, 344 F.2d 107,
108-09 (2d Cir. 1965).
5 See, e.g., National Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 457 F.2d 1127, 1138
(2d Cir. 1972). Once the Board rules, the court incorporates the Board's decision into its
final judgment on the contract action. Cf. Barabas v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 451 F. Supp.
765, 769-70 (S.D.N.Y.) (incorporating NLRB Regional Director's opinion into judgment in
contract action), afl'd per curiam, 577 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1978).
16 Todd Shipyards is still valid in the Second Circuit. See Botany Indus., Inc. v. New
York Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 375 F. Supp. 485, 488-94, vacated and
dismissed as moot sub nom. Robb v. New York Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers,
506 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974). See also United Optical Workers Local 408 v. Sterling Optical
Co., 500 F.2d 220, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1974) (dictum).
Although not explicitly discussing the issue of primary jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit
implicitly has followed the Second Circuit by permitting courts to decide whether contract
clauses violate section 8(e). El Paso Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. El Paso Chapter,
Associated Gen. Contractors, 376 F.2d 797, 801 (5th Cir. 1967). Cf. Local 48, Sheet Metal
Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Hardy Corp., 332 F.2d 682, 686-87 (5th Cir. 1964) (evaluating whether
judicial enforcement of hot cargo clause would constitute an unfair labor practice under
LMRA § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976)). Several other courts have ruled
on the validity of hot cargo clauses in section 301(a) actions without considering the primary
jurisdiction problem. See Pittsburgh Die Sinkers Lodge No. 50 v. Pittsburgh Forgings Co.,
255 F. Supp. 142, 146 (W.D. Pa. 1966); Coulon v. Carey Cadillac Renting Co., 231 F. Supp.
991 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Cf. Local 1898, 1AM v. Brake & Elec. Sales Corp., 279 F.2d 590, 592
(1st Cir. 1960) (determining that union's interpretation of union security clause would re-
quire the employer to commit an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(3)).
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The Third17 and Ninth18 Circuits follow the opposite ap-
proach. Deferring to the NLRB's primary jurisdiction, these cir-
cuits refuse to consider the merits of a section 8(e) claim when the
employer raises it in the context of section 301(a).19 They simply
render judgment on the breach of contract claim; the employer can
raise the hot cargo issue only by lodging an unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB.
The District of Columbia Circuit recently adopted a third
approach. In Mullins v. Kaiser Steel Corp.,20 the court refused to
consider the hot cargo issue when the employer raised it as a de-
fense against a union pension fund trustee suing as a third party
beneficiary to the collective bargaining agreement. Grounding its
decision on equitable considerations, the court reasoned that union
pension fund trustees are entitled to special protection against ille-
gality defenses raised by an employer in a breach of contract ac-
tion. It implied, however, that its disposition might be different in
a case not involving pension fund trustees.2 1
II. THE CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE: DUAL REMEDIES FOR
SECTION 8(e) VIOLATIONS
As a general rule, the NLRB has primary jurisdiction to rem-
17 Huge.v. Long's Hauling Co., 590 F.2d 457, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 918 (1979).
18 Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. Maloney Specialties, Inc., 639 F.2d
487, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1980); Waggoner v. R. McGray, Inc., 607 F.2d 1229, 1234-36 (9th Cir.
1979).
1" In Waggoner, the Ninth Circuit followed the Third Circuit's decision in Huge by
holding that the NLRB's primary jurisdiction requires that a court refrain from determining
whether an unfair labor practice has occurred, even when the unfair labor practice involves
a contract clause that the court is enforcing under section 301(a). 607 F.2d at 1235. Cf.
Heavy Contractor's Ass'n, Inc. v. International Hod Carriers Local 1140, 312 F. Supp. 1345,
1348 (D. Neb. 1969) (addressing the union's argument that a unilateral modification of the
confract by the employer would constitute an unfair labor practice under LMRA § 8(d), 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), and holding that "the determination of whether an unfair labor
practice has been committed is not a matter for decision by this Court"), aff'd per curiam,
430 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1970).
20 642 F.2d 1302, 1313-18 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981) (No. 80-
1345).
21 In reserving the issue the court observed:
Whether a union can obtain specific performance, or even damages for breach, on a
contract that is still executory and clearly violative of section 8(e) is a different ques-
tion from whether the trustees of a welfare fund may recover money due on a contract
already fully performed on the union side and only arguably violative of section 8(e).
Id. at 1318 n.13. See also Huge v. Long's Hauling Co., 590 F.2d 457, 464-65 (3d Cir. 1978)
(Adams, J., concurring), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 918 (1979).
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edy unfair labor practices."2 Hot cargo claims have priority over
most other unfair labor practice charges, and if the NLRB Re-
gional Director "has reasonable cause to believe such [a] charge is
true," he can obtain a temporary restraining order from a federal
district court.23 The NLRB investigates the allegations, and in a
meritorious case the Board can seek a permanent court injunction
against performance of the agreement.24 Several circuits have con-
cluded that by including the hot cargo prohibition with other un-
fair labor practices in section 8, Congress intended hot cargo issues
to be resolved only by the NLRB.25 This interpretation, however,
ignores the principal impetus for the hot cargo prohibition as well
as the language and legislative history of section 8(e).
A. Sand Door: The Impetus for the Hot Cargo Prohibition
As originally enacted, the secondary boycott provisions of sec-
tion 8(b)(4) of the LMRA8 provided that a union could not
threaten, coerce, restrain, or strike against any person when the
purpose is to pressure a neutral employer to cease doing business
with a primary employer. These provisions dealt with coercion of a
neutral party; they did not address directly the situation in which
the primary employer had agreed to the inclusion of a hot cargo
clause in the contract. Nonetheless, in Local 1976, United Brother-
hood of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door),2 7 the Supreme Court
ruled that a union may not use a hot cargo agreement to defend
against a section 8(b)(4) proceeding arising from a strike to enforce
the agreement. 28 Although the secondary employer had agreed to
cease doing business with the primary employer, the union's strike
to enforce the hot cargo clause constituted coercion sufficient to
2 See text and notes at notes 42-49 infra. The usual remedies available for unfair labor
practices are enumerated in section 10 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976). See generally
D. McDOWELL & K. HUHN, NLRB REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRAcTicEs (1976).
2S 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1976).
" Id. §§ 160(c), (e).
21 "The Congressional scheme for centralized administration of national labor policy
would be significantly undermined if courts were permitted to adjudicate unfair labor prac-
tice claims independent of the NLRB." Waggoner v. R. McGray, Inc., 607 F.2d 1229, 1235
(9th Cir. 1979). See also Mullins v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 642 F.2d 1302, 1313-18 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981) (No. 80-1345); Huge v. Long's Hauling Co., 590
F.2d 457, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 918 (1979).
"' Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. 141 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976)).
27 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
2 Id. at 101-08.
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violate section 8(b)(4). 29
Sand Door implied, however, that although hot cargo agree-
ments do not provide a defense to unfair labor practice proceed-
ings, they might have other legal effects that would have a subtle
influence on secondary employers.30 Section 8(e), added by the
LMRDA,- l closed this potential loophole in the secondary boycott
prohibition of section 8(b)(4) by making hot cargo agreements
themselves generally unenforceable.3 2 In National Woodwork
Manufacturers Association v. NLRB,33 the Supreme Court recog-
nized that Congress designed section 8(e) to protect employers
against union actions under section 301 to enforce hot cargo
agreements:
Section 8(e) was designed to plug this gap in the legislation by
making the "hot cargo" clause itself unlawful. The Sand Door
decision was believed by Congress not only to create the possi-
bility of damage actions against employers for breaches of
"hot cargo" clauses, but also to create a situation in which
such clauses might be employed to exert subtle pressures
upon employers to engage in "voluntary" boycotts.
3 4
19 Id. at 106-07. Congress later confirmed this interpretation of section 8(b)(4). Pub. L.
No. 86-257, § 704(a), 73 Stat. 542 (1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(A)
(1976)).
10 The implication arose from this observation in Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the
majority:
Certainly the voluntary observance of a hot cargo provision by an employer does not
constitute a violation of § 8(b)(4)(A), and its mere execution is not . . . prima facie
evidence of prohibited inducement of employees. It does not necessarily follow from
the fact that the unions cannot invoke the contractual provision in the manner in
which they sought to do so in the present cases that it may not, in some totally differ-
ent context . . . still have legal radiations affecting the relations between the parties.
Id. at 108.
, See note 1 supra.
32 During consideration of the bill containing section 8(e), various committee reports
and *several congressmen expressed concern about the implications of Sand Door and sug-
gested closing the loophole in the secondary boycott provisions of section 8(b)(4) created by
that decision. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1959), reprinted in 1 LMRDA
HIsTORY, supra note 2, at 778-79; S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 78-80 (1959), re-
printed in 1 LMRDA HISTORY, supra note 2, at 474-77; 105 CONG. REc. 3951-52 (1959)
(remarks of Sen. McClellan), reprinted in 2 LMRDA HIsToRY, supra note 2, at 1007; id. at
16590 (remarks of Rep. Thompson), reprinted in 2 LMRDA HIsTORY, supra note 2, at 1708.
-3 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
-, Id. at 634 (footnote omitted). See also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steam-
fitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 628 (1975). In dissent, Justice Stewart observed that "[s]ince
§ 8(e) provides that any prohibited agreement is 'unenforcible [sic] and void,' any union
effort to invoke legal processes to compel the neutral employer to comply with this purely
voluntary agreement would obviously be unavailing." Id. at 650 n.9.
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B. The Language and Legislative History of Section 8(e)
The express language of section 8(e) not only declares hot
cargo clauses to be unfair labor practices, but pronounces them
"unenforcible [sic] and void" as well.3 5 Because of the contractual
nature of hot cargo clauses, this language must be read in conjunc-
tion with section 301(a), which provides that "[s]uits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization ...
may be brought in any district court of the United States ....
If Congress meant for primary jurisdiction to prevail here, the "un-
enforceable and void" language would be superfluous.3 7 The lan-
guage adds nothing to the NLRB's enforcement powers: even with-
out it the Board would have the power under section 10(e) of the
LMRA to thwart union enforcement of hot cargo agreements.38
The language only can be properly read as indicating a congres-
sional intent to provide dual forums for remedying section 8(e)
violations.3 9
" See note 1 supra.
36 See note 5 supra.
37 The language of the garment industry proviso in section 8(e) also undermines the
argument that Congress meant for the Board to have primary jurisdiction over these dis-
putes. After excluding certain contracts in the garment industry from the coverage of sec-
tion 8(e), the proviso goes on to state "[tihat nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit the
enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing exception," 29 U.S.C. § 158(e)
(1976), implying that section 8(e) prohibits the enforcement of other hot cargo agreements.
" Id. § 160(e). Under section 10(e), the Board can petition a court of appeals for en-
forcement of its decisions. It might be argued that Congress intended the "unenforceable
and void" language to apply in section 301(a) actions only after the NLRB ruled on the
issue of illegality. This view, however, is unreasonable. No union would bring a section
301(a) action to enforce a hot cargo agreement after the NLRB had resolved the issue. After
a Board decision, a section 10(e) enforcement order would prevent the section 301(a) action
even without the section 8(e) language.
" As originally introduced in the Senate, the bill containing section 8(e) did not pro-
hibit hot cargo agreements. See S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 1
LMRDA HISTORY, supra note 2, at 338. Senator Gore proposed an amendment to prohibit
hot cargo agreements in the trucking industry, but did not include the "unenforceable and
void" language. 105 CONG. REc. 6556 (1959), reprinted in 2 LMRDA HISTORY, supra note 2,
at 1161-62. Senator Smathers later proposed the addition of this language to Senator Gore's
hot cargo prohibition and stated that his amendment would reach contracts already in force.
105 CONG. REc. 6730 (1959), reprinted in 2 LMRDA HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1242. At least
one court has interpreted this legislative history to mean that the unenforceable and void
language was added to section 8(e) only to reach contracts in force at the time of its adop-
tion. Mullins v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 466 F. Supp. 911, 916 (D.D.C. 1979), afl'd, 642 F.2d 1302
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981) (No. 80-1345). This result cannot have
been the only purpose of the amendment, however, because it does not explain why the
language voids hot cargo agreements entered into "hereafter." See id., 642 F.2d at 1333
(Wilkey, J., dissenting) ("I believe that Congress meant what it said, and that these clauses
are unenforceable by the federal Courts."). A House amendment to the Senate bill extended
19811
The University of Chicago Law Review
The legislative history reinforces this interpretation. Numer-
ous congressmen emphasized that section 8(e) made hot cargo
agreements both unfair labor practices and unenforceable and
void.40 Senator Goldwater explained the consequences of the addi-
tional language by observing that under section 8(e), the breach of
a hot cargo agreement "does not constitute a good cause of action
in a suit at law to recover damages for the breach or to secure spe-
cific performance of the agreement. '41
III. NLRB PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
In addition to the language and legislative history of section
8(e), a careful analysis of the contours of the NLRB's primary
jurisdiction indicates that courts should not be divested of juris-
diction over hot cargo issues in section 301(a) actions.
The theory of NLRB primary jurisdiction is deceptively
straightforward. Sections 7 and 8 of the LMRA respectively enu-
merate protected and prohibited activities in the labor field.42 Sec-
tion 8 enumerates unfair labor practices, over which Congress gave
the NLRB jurisdiction.43 In Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 4 the
Supreme Court observed that Congress's main purpose in estab-
lishing the NLRB was to create an agency having special famil-
the hot cargo prohibition to all labor-management contracts, except for certain contracts in
the garment and construction industries. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 39 (1959), reprinted in 1 LMRDA HISTORY, supra note 2, at 943.
40 105 CONG. REC. 7022 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 2 LMRDA His-
TORY, supra note 2, at 1258; id. at 10104, 17904 (remarks of Sen. Goldwater), reprinted in 2
LMRDA HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1290, 1437; id. at 14347-48 (remarks of Rep. Griffin),
reprinted in 2 LMRDA HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1523; id. at 15545 (remarks of Rep.
Rhodes), reprinted in 2 LMRDA HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1581. See also H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1959), reprinted in 1 LMRDA HISTORY, supra note 2, at
943.
4, 105 CONG. REc. A8523 (1959), reprinted in 2 LMRDA HISTORY, supra note 2, at
1857. Cf. 105 CONG. REc. 17900 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy), reprinted in 2 LMRDA
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1433 (section 8(e) is not intended "to change the law with respect
to the judicial enforcement of [contracts covered by the construction industry proviso],"
implying that judicial enforcement of other contracts is affected).
Because hot cargo agreements are generally unenforceable, pension fund agreements
that violate section 8(e) are unenforceable whether the obligation to honor the agreement
arises from LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976); ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3) (1976); or Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, § 306(a), 29
U.S.C.A. § 1145 (1981 Supp.) (statutory obligation to honor multiemployer pension fund
agreements).
42 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1976).
43 Id. § 158; LMRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976) (granting NLRB jurisdiction over
unfair labor practices defined in section 8).
14 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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iarity with the complex factual problems arising in the field of la-
bor relations. 45 According to the Court, only an agency with
administrative expertise in the field could apply the LMRA with
the consistency that Congress desired; concurrent forums for reme-
dying unfair labor practices might undermine uniform interpreta-
tion of the Act or provide inconsistent remedies.46
Although Garner dealt with a conflict between state courts
and the NLRB,'4 7 the policy of deferring to administrative exper-
tise also divests federal forums of jurisdiction over some unfair
labor practice issues. In San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon,45 the Supreme Court devised an appealingly simple
formula for invoking primary jurisdiction: "[w]hen an activity is
arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the
federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board . . .,.
The Supreme Court has developed numerous exceptions to the
Garmon formula.50 These exceptions do not diminish the impor-
45 Id. at 490.
41 Id. at 488-91, 501. The policy favoring administrative expertise arises from general
principles of administrative law:
[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or
cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress
for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This is so even though the
facts after they have been appraised by specialized competence serve as a premise for
legal consequences to be judicially defined. Uniformity and consistency in the regula-
tion of business entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited functions
of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascer-
taining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are
better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience,
and by more flexible procedure.
Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952).
"" 346 U.S. at 490-91. In Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 543-44 (1945), the Supreme Court
declared for the first time that state statutes that interfere with the policies of federal labor
legislation are void. In Garner, the Court went further by ruling that the states could not
provide alternative remedies for the unfair labor practices enumerated in section 8 of the
LMRA. 346 U.S. at 490-91. See also Meltzer (pt. 1), supra note 6, at 6, 15-17.
48 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
41 Id. at 245. Garmon held that the assumption of jurisdiction by a state court over the
labor dispute at issue was improper. Id. at 246.
50 The Garmon rule does not preempt state court jurisdiction in cases involving con-
duct "so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that ... [the Supreme Court]
could not infer that Congress. . .deprived the States of the power to act." Id. at 244. See,
e.g., UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (union violence). Other exceptions to Garmon are
discussed in the remainder of this part. For general discussion of NLRB primary jurisdic-
tion and its exceptions, see Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1337
(1972); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 469 (1972).
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tance of the policies underlying primary jurisdiction; rather, they
indicate that under some circumstances, a competing policy or a
special expertise of the federal courts justifies the potential inter-
ference with uniform application of the LMRA. 51 This part con-
siders these exceptions to decide whether hot cargo cases brought
under section 301(a) are sufficiently analogous to justify exempting
them as well from the NLRB's primary jurisdiction.
A. The Section 301(a) Exception
Congress enacted section 301(a) in the Labor Management Re-
lations Act of 1947.52 In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,5 s
the Supreme Court interpreted section 301(a) to reflect a firm con-
gressional policy that a judicial forum could provide a more
prompt and effective remedy for breach of contract than could the
processes of the Board." Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas
51 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967) ("[T]he decision to preempt federal and
state court jurisdiction over a given class of cases must depend upon the nature of the par-
ticular interests being asserted and the effect upon the administration of national labor poli-
cies of concurrent judicial and administrative remedies."). See also Amalgamated Ass'n of
St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 318 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
52 Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 301(a), 61 Stat. 136, 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1976)). See note 5 supra.
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
'4 Id. at 451-55. The principal evidence for the Court's position was a statement in the
conference report:
The Senate amendment contained a provision which does not appear in section 8
of existing law. This provision would have made it an unfair labor practice to violate
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or an agreement to submit a labor dis-
pute to arbitration. The Conference Agreement omits this provision of the Senate
amendment. Once parties have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement
of that contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGiSLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 545-46 (1948) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter cited as LMRA HISTORY]. Congress's principal purpose in extending
federal jurisdiction to cover labor-management agreements was to avoid the procedural diffi-
culties of suing unincorporated unions for breach of contract. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 16-18 (1947), reprinted in 1 LMRA HISTORY, supra, at 422-24; 93 CONG. REc. 3839
(1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2 LMRA HISTORY, supra, at 1014. Under the
Senate bill, both the NLRB and the federal courts would have had jurisdiction to enforce
collective bargaining agreements. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 8(a)(6), (b)(5) (1947),
reprinted in 1 LMRA HISTORY, supra, at 111, 114. Several members of the conference com-
mittee objected to NLRB jurisdiction over breach of contract actions. See, e.g., 93 CONG.
REc. 6443 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft), reprinted in 2 LMRA HISTORY, supra, at 1539. See
also S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (pt. 2) 13 (1947) (minority report), reprinted in 2
LMRA HISTORY, supra, at 475. The conference committee consequently eliminated Board
jurisdiction over labor-management agreements, leaving only the right of action in the fed-
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noted that section 301(a) "does more than confer jurisdiction in
the federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses a federal
policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on be-
half of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can
be best obtained only in that way."' 5 He concluded that section
301(a) granted the federal courts substantive powers to fashion a
body of federal law to promote the prompt and effective enforce-
ment of labor-management contracts.56
Once the judicial forum for contractual enforcement had been
established, the Court began to delineate the manner in which ju-
dicial and Board remedies were to be integrated. In Smith v. Eve-
ning News Association,57 the Court made clear that the NLRB's
primary jurisdiction does not require the dismissal of a section
301(a) action simply because the breach of contract also involves
activity prohibited under section 8 of the LMRA.5 8 The contract in
that case prohibited discrimination between union and nonunion
employees. The employer violated the contract by locking out a
union employee while permitting nonunion executive staff to con-
tinue working. Because the discrimination arguably was an unfair
labor practice under section 8(a)(3),5 9 the Michigan courts applied
the Garmon rule and dismissed the employee's claim. 0 In revers-
eral courts under section 301(a).
55 353 U.S. at 455 (1957).
56 Id. at 456-58. Justice Douglas enumerated the possible sources of the new federal
law:
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It
points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems
will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statu-
tory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashion-
ing a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be
determined by the nature of the problem.
Id. at 457.
5 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
58 Id. at 195-98. Smith relied on two earlier cases that had dismissed summarily the
contention that the NLRB's primary jurisdiction extended to a section 301(a) action when
the breach of contract involved arguably protected strike activity. See Atkinson v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 245 n.5 (1962); Local 174, International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9 (1962) ("Since this was a suit for violation of a collec-
tive bargaining contract within the purview of § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, the pre-emptive doctrine of cases such as [Garmon], based upon the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, is not relevant."). Smith was reaffirmed
and extended to suits for an injunction in William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Coun-
cil, 417 U.S. 12, 16-20 (1974).
59 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
40 See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 362 Mich. 350, 365, 106 N.W.2d 785, 786 (1961),
rev'd, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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ing, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he authority of the Board to
deal with an unfair labor practice which also violates a collective
bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301, but it is not exclu-
sive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits
under § 301.2 '
In asserting jurisdiction over hot cargo issues, the Second Cir-
cuit has interpreted Smith as creating a broad exception to the
NLRB's primary jurisdiction for all unfair labor practices arising
in section 301(a) actions.2 The reasoning of Smith, however, is not
fully applicable to hot cargo controversies. In cases like Smith, the
party seeking judicial relief is squarely within the policies of sec-
tion 301(a) because it requests the prompt enforcement of the con-
tract's terms.6 3 The court simply is asked to enforce the parties'
private bargain.6 4 In hot cargo disputes, only the union seeks en-
forcement of the agreement. The employer, seeking to avoid the
Board's primary jurisdiction, asks the court to sanction the viola-
tion of the contract's terms; it asks the court to apply not the
terms of the contract, but the terms of section 8(e). 5 The analogy
6' 371 U.S. at 197.
62 "The Supreme Court has all but sounded the death-knell of the theory of exclusive
NLRB jurisdiction in cases arising under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act." Carey v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 499, 508 (2d Cir. 1963). One could interpret ill-
phrased dicta from other Supreme Court opinions as supporting the Second Circuit's view.
See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238,
245 n.5 (1962); Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 n.9
(1962). The implications of these cases actually are narrower than their language might indi-
cate. See text and notes at notes 63-65 infra.
63 Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 183-88 (1967) (court has jurisdiction over fair repre-
sentation issues in part because such issues frequently are conditions precedent to an em-
ployee's section 301(a) contract enforcement action against the employer).
" In addition to the contract enforcement policy of section 301(a), cases like Smith also
engage the federal labor policy of promoting grievance settlement procedures chosen by par-
ties to collective bargaining agreements. William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council,
417 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1974). See also Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 843 (1971)
(when dispute is arbitrable, Board exercises discretion to defer unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings pending arbitration because it is "consistent with the fundamental objectives of
Federal law to require the parties here to honor their contractual obligations rather than, by
casting this dispute in statutory terms, to ignore their agreed-upon procedures"); 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1976) (settlement of contract disputes by "a method agreed upon by the parties"
is more desirable than government conciliation and mediation). The same policy permits
arbitration in cases normally reserved for the NLRB. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 263-66 (1964) (court may order arbitration even when dispute concerns
work assignments usually decided by the NLRB). This policy favoring private resolution
obviously is not applicable in the section 301(a) hot cargo case.
5 See Waggoner v. R. McGray, Inc., 607 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1979). Relying on Amalga-
mated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 300-01 (1971), Waggoner argued
that "the primary jurisdiction principle is displaced in section 301 actions only to the extent
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to Smith, therefore, is imperfect. 6
B. The Section 303 Exception
Under section 303 of the LMRA,67 anyone injured by a strike
or coercion consituting an unfair labor practice under section
8(b)(4)"s may bring suit in federal court for compensatory dam-
ages. In International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union
v. Juneau Spruce Corp.,"9 the Supreme Court rejected the claim
that the Board had primary jurisdiction over section 8(b)(4) issues
in such suits, concluding that Congress intended to create indepen-
dent remedies before the courts and the Board.70 As a result,
federal courts in section 303 actions may decide for themselves
whether unfair labor practices under section 8(b)(4) have been
committed.
Some section 303 damage actions inevitably involve hot cargo
that the section 301 action is governed by the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment." 607 F.2d at 1235 (emphasis added).
6 Another exception to the NLRB's primary jurisdiction, sometimes cited in support of
judicial resolution of hot cargo issues, also is not squarely on point. When unfair labor prac-
tice issues arise in antitrust actions, the courts do not defer to the NLRB's primary jurisdic-
tion. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 626 (1975)
("the federal courts may decide labor law questions that emerge as collateral issues in suits
brought under independent federal remedies, including the antitrust laws"); Local 189,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 684-88 (1965) (opinion of White,
J.) (same); id. at 710 n.18 (Goldberg, J., concurring in the result) (same). The Connell ex-
ception represents a balance between the policies of antitrust enforcement and the policies
of NLRB primary jurisdiction and thus is not directly applicable in the section 301(a) hot
cargo context. See Mullins v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 642 F.2d 1302, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981) (No. 80-1345); Waggoner v. R. McGray, Inc., 607 F.2d 1229,
1236 n.9 (9th Cir. 1979); Huge v. Long's Hauling Co., 590 F.2d 457, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 918 (1979). However, the Connell exception illustrates the reasoning
process used by the Supreme Court in making exceptions to the NLRB's primary jurisdic-
tion. Under this balancing approach, the importance of limiting secondary boycott activities
by labor unions would seem to justify a similar exception for hot cargo issues. See text and
notes at notes 67-77 supra.
67 69 U.S.C. § 187 (1976). The section provides in part-
(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry or
activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any activity or
conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section 158(b)(4) of this title.
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason [of] any viola-
tion of subsection (a) of this section may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States ... and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the
suit.
48 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
342 U.S. 237 (1952).
70 Id. at 243-45. See also Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258 n.13
(1964).
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issues, 7 and concurrent jurisdiction creates the possibility of con-
flicting decisions emanating from different forums in the same
case.72 Congress, however, expressly provided in section 303 that
the courts serve as an alternative forum for remedying section
8(b)(4) unfair labor practices, concluding that the secondary boy-
cotts prohibited by section 8(b)(4) are so dangerous to weak neu-
tral employers that the victims of such practices require a prompt
and complete remedy against the boycotting union."
71 Section 8(b)(4) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to strike against or
threaten and coerce any employer when the object is, among other things, to force the em-
ployer to enter into an illegal hot cargo agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) (1976). The
section also makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to strike against or threaten and
coerce an employer to enforce an illegal hot cargo agreement. Id. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). When
unfair labor practices defined by sections 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) or (B) underlie a section 303 damage
action, the court must determine whether the agreement that the union sought or enforced
was an illegal hot cargo agreement. See, e.g., Feather v. UMW Dist. 2, 470 F. Supp. 606, 607-
09 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 7, 452 F. Supp. 1381, 1385-86 (D.
Colo. 1978); Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 99,
114-18 (D. Hawaii 1975), aff'd as to antitrust defense, 579 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979).
72 In United Brick & Clay Workers v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952), a case not involving hot cargo issues, the court and the Board
reached inconsistent results. Compare id. (deciding in a section 303 action that strike vio-
lated section 8(b)(4)) with NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1952)
(NLRB decision in section 8(b)(4) proceeding that strike did not violate that section; en-
forcement granted), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953). The Sixth Circuit rationalized the
inconsistency thus:
We recognize that this finding is contrary to the finding in the companion case of
N.L.R.B. v. Deena Artware, Inc ..... Under our existing system of courts, juries, ad-
ministrative agencies, and appellate review, such findings, even though inconsistent, are
not invalid .... The two proceedings, even though arising out of the same labor dis-
pute, were heard by separate fact finding agencies .... Nedessarily, the evidence pro-
duced in the different proceedings. . . was not identical. Each fact finding agency was
entitled to make its own decision upon the evidence before it.
198 F.2d at 642.
73 During the consideration of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Re-
lations Act in 1947, a principal concern of Congress was the inadequacy of Board remedies
for small neutral employers who became embroiled in a labor dispute because of a union's
secondary boycott activities. Senators who proposed the amendment adding the section 303
damage action to the bill did so to provide prompt and complete relief for these neutral
employers:
To a small storekeeper, or machine shop [sic], picketed out of business by unions inter-
vening between him and his employees, or to the farmer prevented from unloading his
perishable produce, the remedy of dealing with the NLRB is a weak reed. There will
only be a satisfactory remedy if he can go to his local court and obtain an injunction,
first temporary and then permanent, against interference of this kind.
In the field of labor relations the large companies can generally look after them-
selves, but the power of the labor unions is being used indiscriminately against the
small businessman, and he is quickly forced to capitulate by danger of bankruptcy.
The amendment proposes that he be entitled to file a suit for damages . . ..
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The hot cargo exception to the NLRB's primary jurisdiction in
section 303 cases provides support for a similar exception for hot
cargo actions brought under section 301(a). The secondary boycott
provisions of section 8(b)(4) protect neutral employers against
union coercion when the purpose of the coercion is to obtain or to
enforce a hot cargo agreement.7 4 The hot cargo prohibition in sec-
tion 8(e) protects neutral employers against the adverse economic
impact of the hot cargo agreement itself.7 5 If a damage remedy for
secondary boycotts is available in the courts under section 303, it is
anomalous to deny a judicial remedy for section 8(e) violations
under section 301(a).7 6 Without such a remedy, neutral employers
who are strong enough to resist a union's demands for hot cargo
agreements and who thereby provoke the union to strike would
have a remedy under section 303, while neutral employers who are
too weak to withstand a strike would be forced to accede to the
union's demands for a hot cargo agreement and suffer without a
judicial remedy.
Moreover, if courts are competent to decide hot cargo issues in
section 303 suits, they surely are competent to decide them in sec-
tion 301(a) suits. If the policies underlying the secondary boycott
prohibitions in section 8(b)(4) are sufficient to outweigh the bene-
fits of the NLRB's primary jurisdiction, those same policies are
sufficient within the context of section 8(e). 7
S. RFP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1947) (supplementary views of Sen. Taft), re-
printed in 1 LMRA HISTORY, supra note 54, at 460. See also 93 CONG. REc. 4836, 4838
(1947) (remarks of Sen. Ball), reprinted in 2 LMRA HISTORY, supra note 54, at 1351, 1355.
The Senate accepted Senator Taft's amendment, 93 CONG. REc. 4874 (1947), reprinted in 2
LMRA HISTORY, supra note 54, at 1400, and the conference committee retained section 303
in the final version of the LMRA, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1947),
reprinted in 1 LMRA HISTORY, supra note 54, at 571.
71 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(A), (B) (1976).
7 Hot cargo agreements frequently will raise the neutral employer's costs by preventing
it from doing business with a low cost supplier or a traditional purchaser. For some employ-
ers, however, the costs of potential strikes or other disruptions of production may exceed
the costs of the hot cargo agreement. In that case, the employer cannot vigorously oppose
the union's proposal for a hot cargo agreement.
76 But see Mullins v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 642 F.2d 1302, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("When
Congress has spoken so directly on the remedies to be provided for statutory violations, it is
not for the courts to add remedies of their own."), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981) (No.
80-1345).
An interpretation of sections 8(e) and 301(a) that permits a judicial remedy under
section 301(a) for the violation of section 8(e) is consistent with the LMRA's system of
employer remedies for serious union unfair labor practices. Although the section 303 damage
remedy does not apply to sections 8(e) and 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976), the section
10(1) expedited Board remedy, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976), does cover them, along with sec-
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C. The Fair Representation Exception
The union's duty of fair representation toward its members
was developed by federal courts that implied a cause of action
from the LMRA's exclusive representation provisions.7 8 In Mi-
randa Fuel Co.,79 however, the NLRB also assumed jurisdiction
over fair representation claims by ruling that a union's breach of
its duty of fair representation constitutes an unfair labor prac-
tice.80 The problem of deference to the Board's primary jurisdic-
tion in this context was addressed by the Supreme Court in Vaca
v. Sipes.81 The Court held that the federal courts may retain juris-
diction over fair representation disputes despite the Board's ruling
that such actions are unfair labor practices.8 2 The Court justified
concurrent jurisdiction in part by arguing that although adminis-
trative expertise is desirable in fair representation cases, the courts
developed the concept and therefore have as much experience in
the area as the Board.8 This considerable expertise with fair rep-
tions 8(b)(4)(ii)(A), (B), and (C), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(A), (B), (C) (1976). All three
unfair labor practices involve serious union pressures and require a prompt remedy for the
employer. Although this justifies expedited Board review under section 10(1), it also justifies
additional remedies, individually tailored for each unfair labor practice.
In secondary boycott cases under section 8(b)(4), the union's coercive activity is the
cause of the employer's damages. Because federal labor law disfavors court ordered anti-
union injunctions, see Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 405-12 (1976);
Norris-LaGuardia Act, §§ 1-15, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976), a damage remedy is provided
under section 303 as an alternative to the section 10(l) procedure. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976). In
organizational picketing cases under section 8(b)(7)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976), the
unresolved representational issue is the principal source of the employer's damages, and
assuming that the procedural requirements are met, the most appropriate remedy is an ex-
pedited Board election, id. In section 8(e) cases, the hot cargo agreement is the principal
source of the employer's damages, and the most appropriate alternative remedy is to apply
the "unenforceable and void" language. This analysis suggests that there also should be an
alternative judicial remedy for the violation of sections 8(b)(7)(A) and (B), but Congress
would have to amend section 303 to provide for a damages remedy.
78 Cf. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (duty of fair representation
arising from exclusive representation provisions of the Railway Labor Act). Syres v. Oil-
workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam), has been interpreted as extending the
duty of fair representation to the LMRA. R. GoEmAN, BAsIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNoNIZA-
TON AND COLLECTr BARGAMNG § 30-1, at 697-98 (1976). The duty of fair representation is
an equitable principle analogous to a fiduciary duty; it arises whenever the union exclusively
represents a group of employees, even if there is no statutory basis for the duty, e.g., Lerma
v. D'Arrigo Bros. Co., 77 Cal. App. 3d 836, 842, 144 Cal. Rptr. 18, 22 (1978).
' 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
80 Id. at 185. The Board ruled that the duty of fair representation arose from section 7
and that its breach violated section 8(b)(1)(A).
81 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
92 Id. at 183.
83 Id. at 180-82. The Court also noted that the procedures of the Board, geared princi-
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resentation issues diminishes, although it does not eliminate, the
danger of conflicting adjudications.
Federal courts have comparable experience with hot cargo is-
sues because of their frequent occurrence in antitrust litigation"4
and in section 303 damage actions.8 5 There is thus no reason for
denying the courts jurisdiction over the same issues in section
301(a) actions.
IV. EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS
In Mullins v. Kaiser Steel Corp.,8 s the District of Columbia
Circuit injected equitable considerations into its evaluation of
whether courts should decide hot cargo issues. In that case, a union
pension fund trustee sued as a third party beneficiary for enforce-
ment of the collective bargaining agreement. Refusing to consider
the employer's hot cargo defense, the court argued that only the
union, and not the innocent pension fund trustees, was responsible
for the illegal agreement.8 7 Because the union might have given
pally to protection of the public interest, might frustrate the primary purpose of fair repre-
sentation by preventing remedies in individual cases. Id. at 182-83.
94 See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616,
626-33 (1975). The Third Circuit has argued that the nonstatutory exemption from the anti-
trust laws for labor-related activity does not extend to activity that forseeably violates sec-
tion 8(e). Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc. (Conex), 602 F.2d
494, 512-22 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980). In
Conex the NLRB already had ruled that the agreement violated section 8(e). International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 221 N.L.R.B. 956, 961 (1975), enforced, 537 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977). In similiar situations, however, the courts presumably
may resolve hot cargo issues as well, because they are collateral labor law issues arising in an
antitrust action. See note 66 supra.
"' See note 71 supra.
86 642 F.2d 1302, 1311-13, 1318 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2044
(1981) (No. 80-1345).
17 The court stated:
As a rule, third-party beneficiaries, like the Trustees here, are subject to the contract
defenses of nonperforming promisors. But the Trustees of a union welfare fund are
sometimes immune from contract defenses that could be asserted against the union
itself because such a rule better serves the concern of federal labor policy to protect
union members and their families from the actionable wrongs of their union repre-
sentatives. . . We see no reason for not applying that exemption here.
Id. at 1312. See also Huge v. Long's Hauling Co., 590 F.2d 457, 464-65 (3d Cir. 1978) (Ad-
ams, J., concurring) ("Ensuring the viability of these funds and protecting the employees'
investment from dissipation as a result of union or employer conduct or misconduct has for
many years been a concern of the federal government."), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 918 (1979).
These courts principally relied on Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 468-71
(1960), in which the Supreme Court ruled that an employer cannot set off damages caused
by union breaches of the collective bargaining agreement against payments due pension
fund trustees. The issue in Benedict essentially was one of contractual interpretation; the
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consideration to the employer in exchange for the hot cargo agree-
ment, voiding the agreement might give a windfall to the employer;
the court therefore simply enforced the contract.88
The court's concern for union pension fund trustees hardly is
justified in the context of section 8(e). If the employer had raised
the hot cargo issue before the Board, the pension fund provision
would have enjoyed no special immunity from the prohibition in
section 8(e).89 The fortuity of a judicial forum should not change
the result in cases like these.
Moreover, section 8(e) is not designed to penalize unions for
misconduct, but to protect neutral employers from illegal secon-
dary boycott activities.90 When enforced by the pension fund trust-
ees, the hot cargo agreement imposes the same costs on employers
as when the union enforces it. If third party beneficiaries could
enforce hot cargo agreements, unions would be able to impose
those costs on employers indirectly, even though they may not do
so directly.
Equitable considerations actually cut in favor of judicial reso-
lution of hot cargo issues. It is a basic legal principle that courts
Court had to decide whether union compliance with the agreement was a condition prece-
dent to the pension fund payments. Id. at 465. Noting the devastating impact that a con-
trary rule would have on the viability of the welfare fund, the Court adopted a rule of
contractual interpretation: "the parties to a collective bargaining agreement must express
their meaning in unequivocal words before they can be said to have agreed that the union's
breaches of its promises should give rise to a defense against the duty assumed by an em-
ployer to contribute to a union welfare fund. . . ." Id. at 471.
In hot cargo cases under section 301(a), the court is not asked to interpret an admit-
tedly valid term of a collective bargaining agreement; it must decide whether the pension
fund obligation was illegal and unenforceable from its inception. See Huge v. Long's Haul-
ing Co., 590 F.2d 457, 467-69 (3d Cir. 1978) (Rosenn, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
915 (1979). At most, Benedict stands for the principle that when two interpretations of a
clause are equally plausible, the court should adopt the one that will most protect the pen-
sion fund trustees; the case should not be interpreted to confer immunity from section 8(e)
on pension fund trustees.
" 642 F.2d at 1312-13. The union had performed fully its obligations under the con-
tract, and only the employer's obligations under the alleged hot cargo agreement remained
executory. The court distinguished this situation from one in which both union and em-
ployer obligations remain executory. Id. at 1318 n.13. The result in Mullins also reflects the
general policy "of preventing people from getting other people's property for nothing when
they purport to be buying it." Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212
U.S. 227, 271 (1909) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
89 Even the Mullins court conceded that the employer could bring his hot cargo allega-
tion before the Board and, if he had a meritorious claim, that the Board could void the
pension provision. 642 F.2d at 1314-15.
90 See text and notes at notes 26-41, 67-77 supra.
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should not become parties to illegal conducts' nor enforce a con-
tract made in violation of public policy.92 The federal courts rou-
tinely follow these precepts in actions to enforce labor-manage-
ment agreements under section 301(a);93 it is difficult to ascertain
why illegal hot cargo agreements deserve greater judicial deference.
If the courts refuse to decide hot cargo issues, the employer
bears an unfair burden; to resolve the claim of illegality, he must
go to the Board.94 A weak employer may wish to leave the hot
91 Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 138 (1922); Waskey v. Hammer, 223 U.S. 85, 94-95
(1912). See also UAW Local 985 v. W.M. Chace Co., 262 F. Supp. 114, 117-18 (E.D. Mich.
1966) ("[N]o court will order a party to do something, if in order to comply with the court's
directive he must commit a crime. This is so despite any protestations that the party con-
tracted to do what it is said that he should be ordered to do.").
" See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948):
The power of the federal courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all
times exercised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of the
United States as manifested in the Constitution, treaties, federal statutes, and applica-
ble legal precedents. Where the enforcement of private agreements would be violative
of that policy, it is the obligation of courts to refrain from such exertions of judicial
power.
Cf. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709, 713 (W.D. Mich. 1969) (in Title VII
actions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. II 1978), labor-management agreement
that violates civil rights statute is void), rev'd on other grounds, 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.
1970), affrd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Puerto Rico Dist. Council of
United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Ebanisteria Quintana, 56 L.R.R.M. 2391 (D.P.R& 1964) (arbi-
tration award is void to the extent that it violates labor statute).
" Under Lincoln Mills the federal courts may apply these principles in construing fed-
eral labor contracts under section 301(a). See note 56 supra; Mullins v. Kaiser Steel Corp.,
642 F.2d 1302, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2044
(1981) (No. 80-1345); Waggoner v. R. McGray, Inc., 607 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Williams, J., dissenting). Cf. Botany Indus., Inc. v. New York Joint Bd., Amalgamated
Clothing Workers, 375 F. Supp. 485, 490-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (in deciding whether a court
may review the legality of an arbitration award the court noted the considerations involved
in refusing to enforce the illegal contract), vacated and dismissed as moot sub nom. Robb v.
New York Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 506 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974).
Kelly v. Kossuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959), poses a potential exception to this judicial refusal
to enforce an illegal contract. The Supreme Court in this nonlabor case denied an antitrust
defense to a breach of contract claim because the antitrust violation was too remote from
the remedy the plaintiff sought. Id. at 520-21. See also Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.,
184 U.S. 540, 549 (1902). The Kelly exception does not apply to hot cargo cases under sec-
tion 301(a), because in those cases the courts are asked to enforce the evil explicitly prohib-
ited by section 8(e). E.g., Waggoner v. R. McGray, Inc., 607 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1979) (delin-
quent obligations clause).
" Furthermore, the NLRB's General Counsel may refuse to issue an unfair labor prac-
tice complaint on the employer's allegations. This action is unreviewable. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d)
(1976); see NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138-39 (1975). See generally Ro-
senblum, A New Look at the General Counsel's Unreviewable Discretion Not to Issue a
Complaint under the NLRA, 86 YALE L.J. 1349 (1977). A refusal by the General Counsel to
issue a complaint effectively would deprive the employer of any opportunity to contest the
hot cargo issue, even if the employer's claim is meritorious. This result indicates that the
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cargo claim in repose until the union brings an action to enforce
the contract.9 5 Unless the courts decide hot cargo issues in section
301(a) actions, an employer with a meritorious hot cargo allegation
must go to the expense and delay of litigating its position in two
forums before obtaining complete relief from the onerous
agreement.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATING BOARD AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES
The possibility of conflict between decisions by the Board and
by the courts in the same case98 should not prevent concurrent ju-
risdiction over hot cargo issues that arise in section 301(a) cases.
Conflict could be avoided if the courts stayed section 301(a) pro-
ceedings until hot cargo issues were decided by the Board. As a
general rule, however, this approach presents several problems.
The NLRB's General Counsel may refuse to initiate unfair labor
practice proceedings. Because his action is unreviewable, he effec-
tively can prevent the Board from determining the legality of the
alleged hot cargo agreement."' In addition, judicial reliance on the
Board's unfair labor practice proceedings may delay a final judg-
ment in the contract action for up to one year.9s This result would
courts should decide hot cargo issues whex they arise in section 301(a) actions to maximize
the enforcement of the hot cargo prohibition in section 8(e). Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
182-83 (1967) (if the court refused jurisdiction the General Counsel might do the same,
leaving the plaintiff without a forum).
95 If the employer raises the hot cargo issue by repudiating the agreement, the union
may file an unfair labor practice charge with the Board under section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1976). A weak employer may prefer to wait until the union sues for enforce-
ment of the contract under section 301(a).
"Such conflict could arise in two ways. The Board could find that an agreement vio-
lated section 8(e) and issue a cease and desist order under section 10(c) of the LMRA, 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), at the same time that the district court issued an order enforcing the
agreement. Alternatively, the Board could find that the employer violated section 8(a)(5) by
repudiating a lawful contract and could issue a bargaining order under section 10(c), while
the court refused under section 301(a) to enforce the same agreement. This inconsistency
might be resolved when the losing party appealed the district court's decision or when the
Board petitioned the court of appeals to enforce its order under section 10(e), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(e) (1976).
The potential conflict resembles that in the Personal Products litigation between the
court, see United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1958), and the
Board, see Personal Prods. Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 563 (1958). The case involved judicial en-
forcement of a no-raiding pact in the face of the Board's preference for barring enforcement
of the agreement. See Meltzer (pt. 2), supra note 6, at 295-97, 300.
97 See text and notes at notes 15-16 supra.
"' See note 94 supra.
'9 In 1976 the median length of time between the filing of an unfair labor practice
charge and final Board decision was 358 days. E. MILLER, AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPRAISAL OF
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undermine the policy underlying section 301(a) of enforcing con-
tracts promptly,100 as well as the policy underlying section 8(e) of
providing a prompt and effective remedy for victims of secondary
union activity.10 1 Moreover, courts do not refer hot cargo issues to
the Board in section 303 cases, in which the employer is strong
enough to resist union demands for inclusion of the clause in the
contract;102 there is, if anything, less justification for judicial refer-
ral to the Board in section 301(a) cases in which the employer is
too weak to resist union pressures.
Although concurrent jurisdiction presents an inevitable risk of
inconsistent decisions, 03 that risk is small. In many hot cargo cases
arising under section 301(a), the employer may have no effective
access to the processes of the Board.10' In some cases, the General
Counsel already may have refused to issue an unfair labor practice
charge in the same dispute.105 In other cases, the six-month limita-
tion period for unfair labor practice charges 0" effectively may pre-
vent Board action on hot cargo allegations that are presented in
court.
07
When the same case is presented to both forums, there is no
THE NLRB 142 (1977). See also B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERL4LS, AND PROBLEMS
98-99 (2d ed. 1977).
100 See text and notes at notes 52-56 supra.
"01 See text and notes at notes 30-41, 67-77 supra.
101 See text and notes at notes 71-77 supra.
108 See text and note at note 72 supra.
104 In several cases the Supreme Court has been more willing to permit a judicial rem-
edy when there is no practical opportunity to obtain a Board characterization of the conduct
involved. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 201-03 (1978) (employer could not raise issue to the Board except by forcibly
provoking union unfair labor practice complaint); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182-88 (1967)
(Court concerned that Board processes might be closed to employee). See also Amalgamated
Ass'n of St. Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 326 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) ("For
activity that is arguably protected, there is no provision for an authoritative decision by the
Board in the first instance; yet the Garmon rule blindly pre-empts other tribunals.").
106 See note 94 supra.
100 LMRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
107 In several hot cargo cases brought under section 301(a), the union pension fund
trustees have argued that the six-month limitations period of section 10(b) applies to hot
cargo issues in section 301(a) actions as well as to hot cargo issues in NLRB proceedings.
See Huge v. Long's Hauling Co., 590 F.2d 457, 469-70 & nn. 4-5 (1978) (Rosenn, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 18 (1979). This view is flawed for two reasons. First, the language
of the statute only bars unfair labor practice proceedings before the Board. Moreover, sec-
tion 8(e)'s policy of preventing the enforcement of hot cargo agreements requires that a
judicial remedy be available for as long as any action to enforce the agreement might be
filed.
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requirement that either the Board1 08 or the court1 09 adopt the
other's concurrent or subsequent characterization of the hot cargo
agreement; however, in the interest of comity, each forum should
avoid making unnecessary characterizations of the hot cargo agree-
ment. For example, the Second Circuit has deferred to the Board
when expedited section 8(e) proceedings were under way and the
Board had petitioned the court for a stay of the section 301(a)
suit.110
When there has been a prior decision by the NLRB, the courts
must defer to it if the Board's proceedings satisfy the requirements
of res judicata or collateral estoppel.111 At the same time, the
Board need not defer to prior judicial decisions; 2 for the sake of
108 See section 10(a) of the LMRA, which states in part-
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from en-
gaging in an unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce. This power shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that have been or may be
established by agreement, law, or otherwise.
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976) (emphasis added). Cf. International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B.
923, 925-26 (Board policy of deferring to arbitrators' awards on unfair labor practice issues
does not deprive the Board of unfair labor practice jurisdiction in such cases), enforced sub
nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1008 (1964); NLRB v.
Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748 (1st Cir.) (state injunction not res judicata in subsequent NLRB
action), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954).
1 9 Cf. United Brick & Clay Workers v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 637, 642-43 (6th
Cir.) (refusing in section 303 action to defer to concurrent NLRB decision in the same case),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952). For cases involving judicial deference to NLRB decisions
on representational and work assignment disputes that conflict with prior arbitration
awards, see, e.g., Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964) (dictum noting
that a subsequent NLRB ruling on work assignment dispute takes precedence over a con-
trary arbitrator's award); General Warehousemen & Helpers Local 767 v. Standard Brands,
Inc., 579 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (refusing to enforce arbitration award inconsis-
tent with Board's later representation award), cert. dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979); UAW v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 619 F.2d 580, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1980) (arbitrator's damage award unen-
forceable because of conflict with later NLRB decision in jurisdictional dispute); Local 7-
210, Oil Workers v. Union Tank Car Co., 475 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1973) (same as Rockwell),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 875 (1973). These cases are inapposite in the context of hot cargo
cases under section 301(a) because they involve deference to the Board on issues that the
Board is peculiarly competent to resolve. See Meltzer (pt. 2), supra note 6, at 292-95.
110 National Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 457 F.2d 1127, 1138 (2d Cir.
1972).
"I Courts generally treat NLRB final judgments as being res judicata and as collater-
ally estopping issues in section 303 damage actions. See International Wire Co. v. Local 138,
IBEW, 475 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973); Paramount Transp. Sys.
v. Teamsters Local 150, 436 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1971); Painters Dist. Council v. Edgewood
Constr. Co., 416 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1969). But see Old Dutch Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers
Local 584, 359 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 832 (1966). The same rule presum-
ably should apply in hot cargo cases brought under section 301(a).
"' See note 108 supra.
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mutual respect and cooperation, however, it should use its discre-
tion to defer to previous judicial resolutions of hot cargo issues un-
less it finds them patently repugnant to the policies of the
LMRA. 113 What is most needed in hot cargo cases is for both the
court and the Board to be sensitive to the demands of comity.""
Exercising their powers with discretion, the Board and the courts
can minimize the risk of inconsistent decisions.
CONCLUSION
A careful examination of the language and legislative history
of section 8(e) suggests that Congress intended federal courts to
decide hot cargo issues arising in section 301(a) actions. In addi-
tion, the section 303 and fair representation exceptions to the
NLRB's primary jurisdiction support a similar exception for hot
cargo issues arising under section 301(a). The exception should ap-
ply regardless of whether the breach of contract action is brought
by the union or by a pension fund trustee who is a third party
beneficiary under the agreement. Conflict between the courts and
the Board can be avoided if both forums use discretion in the exer-
cise of their jurisdictional powers.
Richard B. Kapnick
113 Cf. Virginia-Carolina Freight Lines, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 447, 451 n.6 (1965) (Board
will not defer to arbitration awards when the award is repugnant to the policies of the
LMRA); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1081-82 (1955) (same). See also R. GORMAN,
supra note 78, §§ 31-2 to -3.
114 Cf. Meltzer (pt.2), supra note 6, at 300 ("The difficulties and uncertainties sur-
rounding Board and judicial power with respect to no-raiding pacts made it particularly
desirable ... for both tribunals to be sensitive to the demands of comity.").
1981] 1015
